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PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE
A Management-side Labor Attorney's Perspective
On Employer's Workplace Theft Investigations.
1/
Mark G. Flaherty --
I. Introduction to Employer's Investigations
Of Employee Theft and Related Litigation
The technology and effectiveness of employer's efforts to
minimize employee theft has improved dramatically over the past ten
years. Ironically, employee theft has skyrocketed over this same
period; it is estimated, by the National Business Crime Information
Network to exceed 200 Billion for calendar year 1987. Employers'
efforts to reduce this staggering number include significantly improved
efforts at loss prevention; i.e., improved lighting, fencing, alarms,
procedures audits, etc., all of which are aimed at preventing, or at
least discouraging, employee theft.
Employers' efforts to identify and discipline their employees
who engage in employee theft remains, however, a significant aspect of
most employers' loss prevention efforts. More and more often, employers
are utilizing trained loss prevention professionals to plan and direct
these efforts.
These professionals routinely use an investigative format
that involves first, the use of trained "undercover" employee(s) who,
while posing as regular employee(s) for generally at least six months,
attempt to observe, and even befriend, those employees engaged in
theft, or the use of unlawful drugs. Second, the loss prevention
professionals dissect the "undercover's" notes and reports, organizing
the notes by suspected employee. Third, additional information such
as criminal records, information from previous employers, work history,
and comments made by other employees about the suspect are added to
1/ Of Husch, Eppenberger, Donohue, Cornfeld & Jenkins, Esqs.,
500 City Center Square, 12th & Baltimore, Kansas City, Missouri
4105. This article first appeared in Privacy in the Workplace,
materials presented by the Section of Litigation of the American Bar
association to the Annual Meeting held on August 9, 1988. It is
reprinted here by permission.
the undercover's observations. 'Next, a rear of trained inteiewe
adequate to interview all suspected employees in a single day, is
assembled in a facility away from the suspected employees ' regular
place of work. The saspected empioyees, generally being told they
will be attending a loss prevention meeting, are then asee bled and
transported en masse to the waiting interviewers.
The interviewers are generally assigned one suspected
em'ployee at a time, whom they take to an individual office. Phe
suspected employee then learns, for the first time, the true purpose
of the meeting. When confronted with the undercover's specific
information, the overwhelming majority of the suspects confess their
wrongdoing. Sworn written statements confirming their own wrongioing
and that of other employees is then obtained. The employee is then
requested to confirm he extent of his or her theft by taking a
polygraph ex:amination. The employees implicated by the original
suspects are then assembled and interviewed until no new implications
are obtained. Often, after admitting their wrongdoing, the employees
are directed to return, or permit the investigators to recover, the
stolen property still in their possession. This investigative format
has been fully described by one of its pioneers, J. Kirk Barefoot, in
two of his books on the subject, Employee Theft Investigations,
Security World Publishing Co., Inc., 1979 and Undercover Investia-
tions, Butterworth Publishers, 1983.
Finally, all employees who admitted wrongdoing are terminate(
and their written admissions are often turned over to local law
enforcement authorities. Additionally, planned press releases are
frequently made at this point to minimize the risk of libel and
slander claims arising out of a careless statement by a company
official.
This investigative format is highly effective in identifying
and eliminating employees who steal from their employer, but it has
also spawned a large volume of litigation around the United States.
This paper will outline the course that this privacy in the workplace
litigation has followed, from the perspective of one of the management
side attorneys who has been defending some of that litigation and,
necessarily, employers' rights to conduct such investigations. My
comments emphasize the legal developments from those investigations
where some or all of the employees were represented by a labor organi
zation and were working under the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement between that labor organization and their employer. I plac
this emphasis since most of this litigation has arisen out of this
setting.
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II. The First Half - Immediate Post-
Investiqation Claims and Charges
Due to the time limits chat accompany most collective
bargaining agreement grievance procedures, employee responses to their
treatment and terminations commence immediately. The employer consid-
ering a large-scale investigation should plan this post-investigation
phase as carefully as the investigation stage since significant
strategic and tactical advantage can be won or lost here.
The early battles come in three arenas: 1) union grievances
2) unemployment compensation claims; and 3) unfair labor practice
charges. Although all of these types of claims are routinely and
effectively handled by the employer's nonlegal staff, that routine
handling is generally inadequate in this setting. This is caused
primarily because of the use of outside professionals to conduct both
the undercover and interview phases of the investigation. Accordingly,
few, if any, of the employer's staff who routinely handle these claims
have any knowledge of the events, the evidence obtained, or the
location of the interviewers.
Further, I offer the following observations concerning each
type of claim. First, the hearings on the unemployment claims are
dangerous. Most state unemployment commissions are, and should be,
predisposed to grant benefits. However, due to the collateral effect
of facts found by unemployment commissions in virtually all states,
these hearings must, to the extent possible, be handled as if they are
trials on the merits of punitive damage claims.
Second, with respect to union grievances, it is my universal
experience that labor organizations are as interested as employers in
eliminating thieves from the workplace. Accordingly, I recommend
informing the employees' union officials of the undercover investiga-
tion and planned interviews early during the undercover phase of the
investigation. The union is then able to focus its attention on the
representation of individual employee suspects, instead of puzzling
over the employer's tactics in obtaining a mass of highly incrimina-
ting evidence. This early union involvement also facilitates the
prompt resolution of most of the inevitable grievances that are filed
over the terminations.
The third kind of claims that are frequently filed are
unfair labor practice charges with the N.L.R.B. Since the employers'
right to investigate theft and the method thereof is always a subject
Df collective bargaining, and thus a basis for grievances, not unfair
Labor practice charges, the N.L.R.B. charges that are filed fall into
only two categories: 1) employer violations of Section 8(a) (1) for
alleged interference with an employee's right to union representation
during the interviews (Weingarten); or 2) union violations of
Section 8(b) for failure to adequately represent the employees during
the interviews. With respect to these alle ged violations, k
observations; first, both can be relatively easily avoided or won by
inviting the union's early involvement, as described abcv-; an,
second, any Winarten charges can be resolved on a non-admission
basis with the mere posting of a N.L.R.B. notice
Employer victories in union grievances, un:mployntr claies,
and unfair labor practice charges are critical to the next phase,
full-blown litigation.
III. The Second Half -- I'll
See You At The Courthouse
The causes of action pled by plaintiffs' attorneys are
myriad. They include: breach of contract, wrongful discharge, breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation,
false light portrayal, invasion of privacy, tortuous interference with
contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion, intentional
infliction of mental and emotional distress, violations of Section 301
of the Labor Management and Relations Act, and violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
Since virtually all of these claims may be, and are, brought
in both state and federal courts by individual employees and groups of
employees, the first problem to reckon with is consolidating related
cases before a single judge, if at all possible. Removal to federal
court in these matters is always possible, if done in a timely manner,
since any cause of action, no matter how pled, arising out of an
employee's (who worked under a collec ve bargaining agreement)
termination, states a federal claim. - If the cases are not consoli-
dated before a single judge, or at least a single federal court,
discovery is a nightmare. Deposition discovery of all plaintiffs
should begin, seriatim, as soon after the case is filed as possible.
As stated above, the employee terminated after an employer's
theft investigation has a multitude of potential claims. The defense
of these lawsuits raises several important questions. Is an employer
liable for RICO violations where it conducts a company investigation
of employee wrongdoing? Can an employer require an employee suspected
of wrongdoing to submit to a polygraph examination? Under what
circumstances can an employee's conduct outside the workplace influence
employee discipline?
2/ Brooks v. Solomon Company, 542 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
74
Perhaps the most important tool in defending these suits is
the doctrine of federal labor preemption. The long established
doctrine of preemption was announced by the Supreme Court in its
Garmon decision. - In Garmon, the court held that where it is clear,
or may be assumed, that the activities which the state purports to
regulate (by statute or common law action) are protected by Saection 7
of the National Labor Relations Act or constitute an unfair labor
practice under Section 8 of the NLRA, the state jurisdiction must
yield to that of the National Labor Relations Board. This aspect of
federal labor preemption is premised on Congress's desire to avoid
zonflicting rules of substantive 1 and remedy, thereby insuring a
zonsistent national labor policy. Under Garmon, states may only
regulate labor-related disputes where the conduct sougnt to be regulated
is of only "peripheral concern" of federal labor laws or where the
onduct touches "interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
-esponsibility" that it would be unreasonable to infer, in the absence
Df compelling congressional5 irection, that Congress had deprived the
state of the power to act. -
Only limited exceptions to the Garmon preemption doctrine
have bVn recognized. In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters, - the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's state law claim
against the union for intentional infliction of rental and emotional
distress was not preempted. At the same time, the court emphasized
the limited application of this exception. The court noted that to
void preemption it was "essential that the state tort be either
Unrelated to employment discrimination or a function of the particu-
*.arly abusive manner in which the discrimination is acco,.plished or
1hreatened rather1 than a function of the actual or threatened discrimi-
nation itself". - Further, the court noted that the employees'
laims were brought not against the employer, but against the union
3/ San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garron, 359 U.S. 236, 79
Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).
4/ Id., 359 U.S. at 242.
5/ Id. at 243-244.
6/ 430 U.S. 290, 97 S. Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 332 (1977).
7/ Id., 430 U.S. at 304.
and the focus of the NLRA, the court re oned, was on the relationship
between the employee and the employer. -
The Farmer exception is a very limited one, and it has been
held that Farmer does not create a per se exception to federal preemp-
tion in all cases involving claims for intentional infliction of
mental and emotional distress. The 9th and 10th Circuits have held
that claims for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress
will routinely be held not to fall within the Farmer exception where
the claims are, in essence, wrongful discharge claims based upon facts
that are intertwined wh the grievance machinery of the collective
bargaining agreement. -
The principles announced in Garmon have been reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in two recent decisions. In WiscojnRn Department of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., - a state
statute which provided remedies for conduct prohibited by the NLRA,
was held preempted by federal labor law because "a conflict is imm n
whenever "two remedies are brought to bear on the same activity". --
The Wisconsin statute prohibited state employees from contracting for
state contracts with companies who had violated the NLRA three times
within a five-year period. Thelpposice result was reached in Baker
v. General Motors Corporation, -- where the court held that a Michigan
statute which denied unemployment compensation to employees who had
financed the labor dispute that resulted in their unemployment by
means other than payment of their regular union dues, was not preempted
The court reasoned that the Social Security Act had intended that the
states have freedom to design their own worker's compensation scheme
and, therefore, that Congress had intended to tolerate the conflict
between the ITLRA and state worker's compensation laws.
While Garmon preemption focuses on potential conflicts
between state and federal labor law, the equally strong preer1ption
8/ See, United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navgation Coa,
63 U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).
9/ Viestenz v. Flering Companies, Inc., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.
1982); Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 577 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1978).
10/ 475 U.S. 282, 106 S. Ct. 1057, 89 L.Ed.2d 223 (1986).
11/ Id., 106 S. Ct. at 1061.
12/ U.S. , 106 5. Ct. 3129, 92 L.Ed.2d 504 (1986).
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rulings on the supremacy of arbitration have recently been re firmed
by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Lueck.
Under Allis-Chalmers preemption, an employee plaintiff simply cannot
substitute state law remedies for his remedies under a collective
bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers held that courts (state or
federal) have no jurisdiction over state law claims brought by an
employee against his employer which are related to the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. The court held that "when resolution
of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the
terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract,
that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 clai {ai. . . or
dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law". -
The Chalmers preemption principles have been applied specifi-
cally in the context of disputes arising out of an employer's investi-
gation of suspected emjgyee wrongdoing. The 5th Circuit in Strachan
v. Union Oil Company, - held that "employees may not resort to state
tort or contract claims in substitution for their rights un¢g the
grievance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement". - 7 In
Strachan, two employees claimed their employer had committed state law
torts in connection with its investigation. The employees had been
required to undergo medical examinations, searches of their persons,
lockers and automobiles. Because the employees were subject to the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the court held their sole
remedy was under the terms of t @I agreement. The Tenth Circuit's
holding in Viestenz v. Fleming - fully discusses the same investiga-
tive format described above and clearly holds all state law claims
related thereto to be preempted.
Allis-Chalmers has also been held to require preemption of
state law invivon of privacy claims. In Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage
Corporation, - the employee was suspected of drug use by his employer.
The employee was required to undergo a body search and a search of his
automobile. While he voluntarily submitted to the search of his
13/ U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985).
14/ Id., 105 S. Ct. at 1915.
15/ 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985).
16/ Id. at 704.
17/ Viestenz, su-Pr, nt. 8.
18/ 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987).
person, he would not consent to a search of his automobile and was
discharged. The court held that the employee's claims required refer-
ence to the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the
body search was reasonable under the terms of the agreement. Having
made this determination, the court held that plaintiff's state law
claims were preempted.
Where the employee is a member of the bargaining unit, the
preemption defense under Garmon, prohibits the dissatisfied employee
from bringing state law claims where the activities which the state
law purports to regulate are protected by Section 7 of the NLRA,
constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8 of the NLRA, or
where Congress intended the activities to be unregulated by the
states. State law claims are also subject to preemption under
Allis-Chalmers where resolution of the state law claim is "substantiall
dependent" upon an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.
With this excellent arsenal of legal defenses, it is rela-
tively easy to eliminate all state law torts from these cases, leaving
only Section 301 claims. Summary judgment on those claims is also
relatively easy to obtain if the union has fulfilled its duty of fair
representation at all during the grievance process.
IV. RICO and Labor and Employment Law
Although arguably preempted as well, employers who conduct
company investigations may still face allegations of "racketeering".
Civi1 9 laims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act - (RICO) have become commonplace in the employment setting. The
provision most commonly used is Section 1962(c) which provides that no
person employed by or associated with an enterprise may conduct or
participate in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering.
The threshold question is wheth16 /the employer has engaged
in a "pattern of racketeering activity". To meet this showing,
the plaintiff must allege "at least two" 2 yedicate acts which relate
to each other as part of a common plan. - The Supreme Court has
held that to establish a RICO pattern, the plaintiff must demonstrate
19/ 18 U.S.C. Sections 161-168 (1984).
20/ 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(a)-(d).
21/ 18 U.S.C. Section 1961.
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'.continuity", that is, the threat of ongoing illegal conduct. The
lower courts have concluded that a scheme to achieve a single objective
does not suffice to show "continuity" even2 ere the objective is
pursued by multiple alleged illegal acts. - Thus, where a company
conducts an investigation with one objective in mind -- to combat
employee theft or illegal drug and alcohol use on company premises --
the RICO "continuity" requirement has no been met and the claim must
fail.
RICO claims by bargaining unit employees are also subject to
attack on grounds of preemption. The Supreme C st's recent decision
in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, - invites the argument
that where employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement
that has a mandatory and binding arbitration clause, as almost all do,
the employee must arbitrate his claim rather than litigating it. In a
unanimous decision, the court held that: (1) RICO claims were not too
complex for arbitration; (2) the alleged "overlap" between RICO's
civil and criminal provisions did not render such claims nonarbitrable;
and (3) the public interest in the enforcement of the RICO Act does
not preclude arbitration.
In Shearson, the arbitration provision appeared in a cu gmer
agreement and was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Admittedly, the RICO claim in Shearson, was not brought in a labor law
context, but courts have uniformly held that the Federa 6 rbitration
Act is applicable to collective bargaining agreements. - While not
yet addressed by the Supreme Court, seemingly, the presumption of
22/ Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Cto
3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985).
23/ Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987);
Garbade v. Great Divide Mining and Milling Corporation, 831 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1987); Condict v. Condict, 815 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1987).
24/ U.S. __, 58 L.W. 4757 (June 8, 1987).
25/ 9 U.S.C. Section 1, et seg.
26/ Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d
ir. 1972); Signal-Stat Corporation v. Local 475, United Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir 1956), cert. denied,
54 U.S. 911, rehearing denied 355 UoS. 852 (1957); Dickstein v.
DuPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971); Tenney EngineeringInc.c v.
inion Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, Local 437, 207 Fo2d 450
3d Cir. 1953).
arbitrability in the labor context, would require the same result as
that in Shearson and require that RICO claims be subject to arbitration.
I also note that any causes of action related to mental or
physical injury in the investigative process are almost always preempted
by state workmen's compensation laws.
V. A Brief Glimpse at State
and Federal Polygraph Law
With the appearance of RICO in the labor setting and the
broadening of the preemption doctrine under Allis-Chalmers, labor and
employment litigation is increasingly becoming the exclusive province
of the federal courts. A proposed federal law regulating the use of
polygraph examinations may further expand federal jurisdiction over
certain employment and labor disputes. In November, 1987, the House
passed a bill banni /the use of polygraph examinations by most
private employers. - In March, 1988, the Senate passed its own
version of the polygraph bill which would prevent most private
employers frV/using polygraph examinations to screen job
applicants. - On May 17, 1988, a Joint House and Senate Conference
reached compromise on a bill which would prohibit the use of polygraph
tests for pre-employment screening.
The House Bill (HR 1212), would have prohibited most private
employers from administering polygraph examinations for any purpose.
The bill specifically exempted private security firms and drug companie
from this ban under certain circumstances. The exception for drug
companies would have permitted testing of employees who had access to
controlled substances. Employers whose primary business is providing
security services, would have been allowed to administer polygraph
examinations to security guards who dealt with the shipment or storage
of radioactive or toxic waste, currency, negotiable securities,
precious commodities, or proprietary information. The exception for
private security firms also would have allowed the testing of guards
whose jobs had a significant impact on health, safety or national
security. Further, the House bill exempted federal, state and local
government employers from the ban.
The Senate version (S 1904), commonly known as the Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, differed significantly from the House bill.
27/ H.R. 1212.
28/ S. 1904.
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While the Senate version of the Act would have prohibited most private
employers from using polygraph examinations for pre-employment screen-
ing, it did permit employers to administer polygraph examinations to
employees during an "ongoing investigation" of theft or any other
incident causing "economic loss or injury" to the employer, so long as
the employer had "reasonable suspicion" that the employee was involved
in the incident. Exceptions for some private industries were also
orovided in the Senate version. The bill would have exempted private
3ecurity firms, nuclear power plants and private consultants under
contract to a federal agency. Like the House bill, federal, state and
Local government employers would have also been exempt. The Senate
version, however, also exempted the Department of Defense, the Depart-
ment of Energy, the National Security Agency, the CIA and the FBI.
These agencies would have been allowed to test private contractors,
experts and consultants working for the agency.
The compromise version is most similar to the Senate bill.
:t retains the Senate provision allowing employers to test employees
7ho are reasonably suspected of being involved in theft or other
activities causing economic injury to the employer. Most of the
compromise between the House and Senate versions concerns which
private industries will be exempted. (The compromise retains the
exemption for federal, state and local governments and a national
security exemption.) Private drug companies continue to be exempt as
provided in the House bill and the exemption for private security
.:irms is retained. However, the Senate bill's exemption for nuclear
power plants is eliminated. Each of the employers qualifying under
one of the above exemptions is subject to certain limitations on
polygraph testing. The person tested must be provided with the
questions in advance, must be allowed to terminate the examination at
.ny time and must be advised of his legal rights and remedies before
,esting. Further, questions related to the employee's race, religion,
Dlitical beliefs, sexual behavior or beliefs regarding labor organiza-
tons may not be asked. This paper being submitted on June 1,
988, but will not be presented until August 8, 1988, by which time
he author predicts th-at a bill close to the Senate version will
uecome law.
While it appears that both the Senate and House bills will
eempt yet another area of state law, the Senate bill specifically
provides that the bill would not preempt any collective bargaining
Egreement or any state law that is more restrictive than the provisions
the federal law. State law, then, will continue to govern in some
dtuations. Several states have wholly outlawed the use of polygraph
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examinations in the employment context, while others proWlit the use
of polygraph examinations as a condition of employment.
In those states where no such ban exists, the new law would
clearly restrict an employer's ability to administer polygraph exami-
nations to its employees. Typically, lawsuits arising out of the
employer's requirement that an employee submit to a polygraph examina-
tion, include claims for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
of mental and emotional distress and wrongful discharge based upon
admissions obtained through the polygraph examination. Currently,
state law gives the employer great latitude in administering polygraph
examinations during an ongoing company investigation. The enforcement
provisions of the Polygraph Protection Act, which include injunctive
and penalty ($10,000.00 per violation) actions by the Secretary of
Labor, plus private actions for legal and equitable relief promise
mountains of new litigation.
In Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, - a Florida case which is
being followed throughout the country, an employee sued his employer
for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress. Anderson,
a nonunion cashier of defendant, was requested by Food Fair's security
officer to report to a motel room in order to take a polygraph exami-
nation in connection with a theft investigation. Once there, the
security officer told her that company policy dictated that she take a
polygraph examination or that she would be discharged. She signed a
form consenting to the polygraph examination. The security officer
advised her that company policy dictated that she admit to prior
thefts and if she refused to do so, she would be terminated as untrust
worthy. The security officer assured her that a confession of prior
thefts would not be used against her. He suggested to her that other
employees who had engaged in company thefts had been retained by
signing statements admitting the theft and making restitution to the
store.
Following this explanation, Anderson, while tearfully
claiming her innocence, signed a statement, dictated by the security
officer, admitting theft of $150.00. A polygraph test was administerE
by the security officer. The security officer told Anderson, "it
didn't clear". Anderson then requested a second polygraph test and
was advised to return the following day. The next day, Anderson met
29/ Delaware, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Alaska, Iowa,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and Washington.
30/ 382 So.2d 150 (Fla. App. 1980).
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again with the security officer. He told her she would have to adrit
to an amount greater than $150.00 and dictated a new starement using
the figure $500.00. After signing the second statement admitting
thefts of $500.00, Anderson submitted to a second polygraph examina-
tion. The security officer told Anderson she still "didn't clear".
Anderson was then advised that she was suspended pending th utcome
of the investigation. She was later terminated based upon her admis-
sions of misappropriation of company cash. The Food Fair court
concluded, as a matter of law, that the security guard's actions were
not sufficiently outrageous to support Anderson's claim for outrage.
Even where a state statute limits or prohibits the use of
polygraph examinations, courts have been hes tnt to award excessive
damages. In Freeman v. Q. Petroleum Corp., the plaintiff, a
former employee of defendant, sued for violations of Minnesota's
statute prohibiting polygraph examinations as a pre-condition of
employment. The employee alleged, after having been discharged, that
ae had been coerced into taking a polygraph examination. The court
neld that the statute provided for non-penalty type liability and
allowed recovery only by persons actually injured by a violation and
then, the employee could recover only provable damages.
The threshold inquiry in nearly all cases alleging claims
irising from polygraph testing is whether the employer's conduct is
reasonable. Even where such conduct is prohibited by statute, the
laintiff must make some showing of unreasonable behavior to justify
in award of damages for a violation. To this extent, the compromise
7ersion of the Polygraph Protection Act is similar to most state law
.n that it allows testing of employees during an investigation so long
Ls the employer has "reasonable suspicion" that the employee was
.nvolved in the conduct giving rise to the investigation.
In the context of company investigations of employee miscon-
duct, conduct outside the workplace normally plays a role in discipline
or discharge only where that conduct influences job performance. In
any of the investigation cases, some employees were suspected of
using drugs and alcohol before work or during their breaks. Other
employees were implicated in theft schemes that involved sales of
stolen merchandise to local flea markets which resold the merchandise.
,mme employees were questioned during their interviews concerning
saxual relations with other employees. Many of the employees who were
n:cused of these activities during their interviews, later brought
claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, false light portrayal and
intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress. As discussed
31/ 676 F.2d 503 (11th Cir. 1982).
above, for all employees working under collective bargaining agreements,
the federal courts have been routinely holding all of these claims
preempted by the federal labor laws, with the employees' sole remedy
being under the collectively bargained grievance process.
Resolution of these claims involves balancing the employee's
privacy rights against the employer's legitimate business concerns.
Where the employer can show an obvious connection between the off-duty
behavior and the employee's job performance, the employer's actions
are usually protected so long as his conduct is reasonable. For
example, an arbitrator upheld the discharge of two truck drivers who,
while intoxicated, assaulted two other drivers from the same company
during a layover. The arbitrator found good cause for the discharg/
because the incident interrupted the company's delivery schedule. -
Similarly, where a resort hotel fired a bellhop after he pled guilty
to selling a stolen handgun to an undercover agent, the arbitrator
concluded that the employee had been fired with just cause because the
employer had a legitimate concer9 32 ver potential liability for property
damage or injury to its guests. -
Absent this link between the off-duty conduct and job
performance, the employer takes significant risk in disciplining or
discharging an employee for off-the-job conduct. The Weyerhaeuser
Company discharged an employee after he admitted smoking marijuana
away from company premises. Unable to show that the employee's work
would be impaired by this off-duty conduct, ta/employee was reinstated
through the grievance arbitration procedure. - An arbitrator
revoked the suspension of two IRS agents who had been suspended after
'mooning" a group of women in a parking garage. The arbitrator noted
that the employer may not "exaggerate unduly wq the public may think
of incidents having no bearing on their job". -
The employer can protect itself by forbidding particular
conduct in company policies or work rules. But where company rules do
not prohibit the off-duty activity or where the fact finder determines
that the plaintiff has not violated the company policy or rule,
employees have prevailed on their claims. The most newsworthy case is
that of Virginia Rulon-Miller, an IBM sales manager, who was demoted
32/ Lucky Stores, Inc., 83 L.A. 760 (1984).
33/ Hilton Hawaiian Village, 76 L.A. 347 (1981).
34/ Weyerhaeuser Company, 86 L.A. 182 (1985).
35/ United States Internal Revenue Service, 77 L.A. 19 (1981).
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for dating an employee of a competitive company. -- IBM had a
written policy governing conflicts of interest upon which the plain-
tiff's demotion was based. Plaintiff sued IBM for intentional inflic-
tion of mental and emotional distress and wrongful discharge. The
court concluded that plaintiff did not violate the conflict of interest
policy by dating the competitor's employee. The court recognized that
plaintiff had a constitutional right of privacy under California law
and that where the prohibited off-duty conduct does not impact on the
2mployer's legitimate business concerns, an employee cannot be dis-
charged or disciplined for that conduct.
If the conduct away from the workplace can be shown to
influence job performance, or where the off-duty conduct is specifi-
cally prohibited by company policy or work rules, the employer can
discharge or discipline on the basis of that conduct without the fear
of claims by dissatisfied employees.
VI. The Federal Labor Preemption
Fortress Remains Strong
In conclusion, the legal protections for those employers
'illing to fight the dramatically increasing problem of workplace
theft, particularly among unionized employees, remain virtually
insurmountable. This bastion must not be breached if the menace of
orkplace theft is to be controlled. The Polygraph Protection Act
.eaves employers with one of their strongest weapons in the fight
igainst workplace theft, the use of polygraph testing in employee
:heft investigations.
36/ Rulon-Miller v. IBM, I IER Cases 405 (1984).
ABOUT NAALJ
For those who have recently joined
NAALJ, or who may be thinking of
joining, we include this brief
description of our association.
The National Association of Administrative Law Judges,
formerly known as the National Association of Administrative Hearing
Officers (NAAHO), is a non-profit, professional organization dedicated to
the improvement of the administrative hearing process. It is comprised of
state, federal, county and municipal administrative law judges, hearing
officers, referees, trial examiners and commissioners, and members of
higher appellate authorities, exercising a wide variety of subject matter
jurisdiction.
NAALJ was established in 1974; it now has members in every
state, Canada, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The New York State
Administrative Law Judges Association, the California Administrative Law
Judges Association and the Illinois Association of Adminstrative Law
Judges are among its largest affiliated local chapters.
NAALJ strives to enhance the quality of administrative justice,
and to improve the process of dispute resolution. It serves as a forum for
the exchange of ideas and information, conducts periodic seminars and
training conferences, publishes a journal, and confers with officials of the
state and federal governments on methods of improving administrative
adjudication. The National Administrative Law Foundation, incorporated
by NAALJ in 1980, is expressly devoted to the public interest.
Membership in NAALJ is open to persons gainfully employed
by government agencies who are empowered to preside over statutory
factfinding hearings or appellate proceedings arising within, among or
before public agencies, or who are empowered to prepare decisions for a
higher tribunal. Other persons may be eligible for associate membership.
National dues for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988
are $35 for all members. Many states have local chapters.
To apply for membership in NAALJ, complete the within
Membership Application and mail it to NAALJ % National Center for the
State Courts, 300 Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8798.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
%National Center for the State Courts
300 Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8798
MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION AND QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer all questions fully. Type or print.
1) NAME:
(last) (first) (M.I.)
2) HOME ADDRESS:
(street) (apt.)
(city) (state) (zip)
3) HOME TEL. #: ( ) BUS. TEL. #: _
4) TITLE (ALJ, HEARING OFFICER, etc.):
5) NAME OF AGENCY (in full):
6) BUSINESS ADDRESS:
(street)
(city) (zip)
7) PLEASE SEND MY MAIL TO: Home Business Address
8) DATE OF BIRTH: SOC. SEC. #:
9) ARE YOU AN ATTORNEY AT LAW? yes no
10) MY PRESENT POSITION IS: elected __ appointed for fixed term
__ appointed for indefinite term competitive civil service
other (explain):
i) MY POSITION IS: full time part time per diem
12) YEAR SERVICE BEGAN:
13) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF JOB DUTIES:
14) ACADEMIC DEGREES & YEARS AWARDED:
15) AWARDS, HONORS, ETC.; OTHER AFFILIATIONS (OPTIONAL):
16) OPTIONAL & CONFIDENTIAL: FOR USE BY THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSA-
TION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES & HEARING OFFICERS.
Salary (or salary range) for your present position:
$ - per . Salary fixed by:
statute civil service board __appointing authority
collective bargaining other (please explain):
============ ==== ==== = -======-== = = =========
17) _ I AM NOW A MEMBER OF THIS ASSOCIATION. (I previously joined
NAALJ or its predecessor, NAAHO.)
18) SIGNATURE: Date:
NEW ORLEANS IS THE SITE OF 1989 NAALJ
ANNUAL CONVENTION AND SEMINAR
New Orleans has been called "The Big Easy" and "The City That Care Forgot".
It is only natural that a city which can play host to two million people
each year for Mardi Gras and is the city of choice for visitors to the
Super Bowl and other sporting events could show visitors how to "Laissez le
bon temps rouler" or "let the good tines roll".
More than six million visitors travel to New Orleans every year. Please be
one of them at the 15th annual NAAIJ convention and seminar, October 12-14,
1989. The convention ccmmittee is planning an exciting and informative
program which will provide continuing judicial education to administrative
law judges in all specialties. There will be a series of lectures and
discussions. Topics will focus on constitutional issues, the role of
public policy, ethics, and evidence, and we are applying for continuing
legal education credits for participants.
Founded by French settlers in 1699, and ruled by Spain during part of the
1700's, the city of New Orleans was part of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.
Louisiana became part of the Union of States in 1812. The new Americans
were not welcame in the French Quarter, or Vieux Carre, and built their
fine hcres on the other side of what is now Canal Street.
The Riverwalk, located a block frcm our hotel, is a unique collection of
stores which offer shopping, dining, and entertainment seven days a week.
The Riverwalk overlooks the Mississippi River, which gives the Crescent
City its shape. Jackson Brewery, a similar developrent on the site of the
old Jax Beer brewery in the French Quarter, is another example of the New
Orleans riverfront renaissance.
Although the "Streetcar Named Desire" is currently only on display, you'can
ride a streetcar from downtown Canal Street, through the Garden District of
stately mansions, near unique above-ground cemetaries and along the
campuses of Tulane and Loyola Universities. A one and one-half hour round
trip is a bargain at $1.20. There is also a new riverfront streetcar line
which travels from Esplanade Avenue on the far edge of the French Quarter
to Julia Street which is within walking distance of the hotel.
There are many family attractions in and around the city. The Audubon Zoo
is a world class zoo which is hone to more than 1,000 exotic and wild
animals. It is located on 58 acres in uptown New Orleans. The reptile
exhibit features the world's only white alligator exhibit. The award
winning Louisiana Swamp Exhibit portrays life and wildlife of the Louisiana
swamps. You can ride the sternwheeler Cotton Blossom from the Riverwalk to
the zoo.
Paddleboats offer harbor tours, plantation tours, swamp tours and moonlight
boat rides. Guided tours of the Superdame are scheduled daily. Walking
tours of the French Quarter are available, or you may tour the Quarter in
horse drawn carriages.
New Orleans is the place where jazz was born and where jazz is at! It's
the foot-tapping turf of the incomparable Pete Fountain, the versatile
Neville Brothers, Allen ("Southern Nights") Toussaint, and the indomitable
Fats Domino. This is also home of the talented Marsalis family - father
Ellis and his sons, Delfayo and two-time Grammy winner Wynton. The
Ambassador of Jazz, Louis "Satchmo" Armstrong, was born here on July 4,
1900. A jazzy city? You bet.
Howe of some of the world's best restaurants, New Orleans offers a variety
of foods to tempt every palate. Paul Prudhamme, owner and celebrity chef
of K-Paul's Louisiana Kitchen, says that Creole and Cajun cooking have
blended over the past several years into a new kind of cooking that's
called "Louisiana food." "Nowhere else have all the ethnic groups merged
to combine all these different tastes," says Prudhcnme, "and the only way
you'll know the difference, honey, is to live 'eml"
Hundreds of flights are scheduled daily to and from New Orleans' Moissant
Airport. You can ride the airport limousine from the airport to our hotel
for $7. Taxi fares fran the airport to the hotel average between $14 -
$16. Amtrak and the Greyhound Bus Line serve the city from their terminal
in the Central Business District.
The host hotel is the Radisson Suite Hotel at 315 Julia Street, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70130. It is located in the Central Business District,
near the French Quarter and two blocks from the Mississippi River. It is
an all-suite hotel, with 253 full-sized one, two, and three bedroom suites.
All suites have a living area, televisions, wet bar, refrigerator, and
spacious bedrocms. A comparable room in the area rents for $110 - $150 per
night. For this convention, we have arranged special low rates of $55 for
single and $65 for double roas. These rates can only be guaranteed
through September 1, 1989.
For an additional $10 per suite, all occupants of the suite are entitled to
a full buffet breakfast in the hotel and complimentary cocktails from 5:00
to 7:00 p.m.
Reservations should be made directly with The Radisson Suite Hotel, 315
Julia Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130, (504) 525-1993 or (800)
333-3333.
To register for this event, couplete the form at the end of this article.
For mre information on any of these events, you may contact Hon. Tan Halko
(504) 361-6662 or Hon. Dennis Dykes (504) 342-2810.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
REGISTRATION FORM
15TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR
OCTOBER 12-14, 1989
NAM EDATE
OFFICIAL TITLE AGENCY
OFFICE MAIIfNG ADDRESS
PHONE( )
HOME MAILING ADDRESS
PHONE( )
Types of cases (i.e. Worker's Comp., U.I., Utility rate making)
Are you a member of NAALJ? Yes _ No
Please register me for the following: Enclosed is my check to the order of
"NAAIJ" to pay for the items checked below.
General Conference Fee $ 160.00
__ Are You interested in a family program?
__ Annual Banquet for _ persons
@ $40.00 per person $ __
Total Enclosed $
otel reservations must be made separately with the Radisson Suite Hotel of New
leans, 315 Julia Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130, (504) 525-1993; or toll
Eree (800) 333-3333
Ilease send form and your check to:
Hon. Tom G. Halko
Appeals Tribunal
16 Westbank Expressway
Suite 207
Gretna, Louisiana 70053
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Jackson Square, originally called the Place d'Armes, served as the public square and para
field in New Orleans early days.
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